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T he promise to boost trans-Atlantic economic exchange in the world’s largest free-trade area 
came along with the aim to “include 
investment… protection provisions 
based on the… highest standards 
of protection that both sides have 
negotiated to date”. This mandate 
for the EU negotiators is in line with 
that defined previously by the EU 
member states for the negotiations 
of a Comprehensive Economic Trade 
Agreement (CETA) with Canada, 
as well as for trade agreements 
Singapore and India, all of which 
shall provide for “the highest 
possible level of legal protection 
and certainty for European investors 
… built upon the Member States’ 
experience and best practices 
regarding their bilateral investment 
treaties”. Indeed, with the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, it is now 
for the European Union to legislate 
on foreign direct investments and 
therefore also to substitute the 1,500 
or so bilateral investment treaties 
that the EU Member States have 
concluded so far with uniform EU 
agreements with third countries.
These bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) are mostly modelled after an 
OECD blueprint whose origin dates 
back to 1952. They provide very 
basic and rather simplistic provisions 
on investment protection standards, 
such as national treatment and non-
discrimination, fair and equitable 
treatment and a prohibition on 
expropriation without adequate 
compensation. Most notably, the 
vast majority of these BITs grant 
foreign investors direct rights of 
action for damages against their 
host state before international 
arbitral tribunals when they feel 
that the host state has not respected 
the rights accepted in the BIT. As 
for their bilateral or reciprocal 
character, already F.A. Mann noted 
in 1981 that it was “rather a matter 
of prestige … than reality.” The 
reality is that no such BIT has ever 
been concluded between two “first 
world” countries. So far the clear 
assumption has been that these 
treaties would provide for protection 
to investors from traditional capital 
exporting countries doing business 
in countries with poor rule of law 
records – and poor altogether. In 
1965 the World Bank sponsored 
a mult i latera l  convent ion for 
e s tab l i sh ing  an  in s t i tu t iona l 
framework for these investor-state-
arbitrations with the official aim to 
provide for sufficient legal certainty 
so that investors would not be put 
off by “political risk” in developing 
countries, and so as to help these 
countries to develop.
How, then, does this development-
led approach square with a deal 
between the world’s two most 
developed economic blocks? Given 
the huge size of US investments in 
Europe and the litigious attitude of 
US firms and especially law firms, 
considerable fears have emerged 
concerning the dangers that such 
unchecked investor-state arbitration 
might entail for our own policy space. 
George Monbiot has polemicized 
in The Guardian that TTIP, with its 
investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) provisions, would be a “full-
frontal assault on democracy”, 
pointing to Philip Morris’ claim for 
billions against Australia after its 
Parliament passed plain packaging 
legislation, and to Eli Lilly’s half-
a-b i l l ion dol lar  c la im against 
Canada after Canadian federal 
courts had invalidated some of the 
US company’s pharmaceutical’s 
patents. International law luminary 
Martti Koskenniemi, the current 
LSE Centennial Professor in Law, 
has warned that the ISDS provisions 
in TTIP would be “a transfer of 
power from public authorities to an 
arbitration body, where a handful 
of people would be able to rule 
whether a country can enact a law 
or not and how the law must be 
interpreted”. Koskenniemi points 
not only to Philip Morris’ claim, but 
also to the multi-billion claim by the 
Swedish energy company Vattenfall 
against Germany for its accelerated 
phasing out of nuclear power after 
Fukoshima, based on the Energy 
Charter Treaty (which was hardly 
designed for investment in the EU 
Internal Market). More recently, the 
French Minister of Foreign Trade 
has expressed France’s opposition 
to the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP, 
echoing fears that US investors 
could challenge French anti-fracking 
laws. A rather clear “Nein” also has 
come from the German Minister of 
Economy, reiterated recently also for 
CETA. In a debate in the UK House 
of Commons, a backbencher for the 
Conservative Party, Zac Goldsmith, 
has asked his government: “Why 
do we need these tribunals for a 
country where the rule of law is 
adhered to, more or less across 
the board?” And the House of Lords 
has  most  recent ly  conc luded 
that “proponents of investment 
protection provisions enforced by an 
ISDS mechanism have yet to make a 
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compelling case for their inclusion in 
TTIP or to convincingly dispel public 
concerns”.
Many of these concerns may, in part, 
be less objective than one would 
like the political debate to be. But 
they do carry some weight, not only 
because the reasons given by the EU 
Commission so far for a supposed 
need of including ISDS are weak and 
almost self-defeating, as I have tried 
to show in a separate policy paper. 
What is more, as rightly pointed out 
by the HoL, “ISDS provisions are in 
themselves only an enforcement 
mechan i sm:  the  subs tan t i ve 
protections afforded to foreign 
investors in the investment chapter 
of a TTIP agreement would matter 
most”. The Commission itself has 
acknowledged that “the decisions 
of arbitral tribunals are only as good 
as the provisions that they have to 
interpret and apply”. This was also 
my point in a report written for 
the EU Parliament in December 
2012, recently publ ished with 
modifications in the International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly. 
There I tried to show how future 
EU investment agreements would, 
if framed along the lines of existing 
BITs and without proper safeguards, 
fundamentally change the current 
law of the Union as regards state 
liability, especially for legislative 
acts. Foreign investors in the EU 
would be able to obtain monetary 
compensation for legislative policy 
decisions that might be perfectly 
lega l  under  EU law but  a re 
nevertheless found by an arbitral 
tribunal to be non-compliant with 
the standards of a EU investment 
agreement. This is true despite the 
fact that the European Court of 
Justice, on the basis of the principles 
common to most Member States, 
has limited the Union’s liability for 
damages to private parties precisely 
with the aim of shielding the 
democratic policy making process 
from the risk of “regulatory chill”.
These issues raised in my report 
sparked a  debate in  the EU 
Parl iament that had not been 
foreseen by the Commiss ion, 
which only wanted to pass a rather 
technical regulation for managing 
financial responsibility under future 
EU investment agreements. The 
European Parliament then voted 
virtually by unanimity (excepting 
only those parties which reject the 
EU altogether) for the inclusion of 
a crucial recital, which ultimately 
survived the opposition from both 
the Commission and the Member 
States: “Union agreements should 
afford foreign investors the same 
high level of protection as Union law 
and the general principles common 
to the laws of the Member States 
grant to investors from within the 
Union, but not a higher level of 
protection. Union agreements should 
ensure that the Union’s legislative 
powers and right to regulate are 
respected and safeguarded.”
As highlighted in my report, this 
was one possible reaction to the 
fears that investor-state arbitration 
tribunals would interpret substantive 
protection standards expansively 
and beyond the level of protection 
that EU investors are guaranteed in 
the EU, whose Internal Market is, 
after all, the world’s most advanced 
economic integration project. A 
much more sophisticated solution 
would have been to do what Article 
340(2) TFEU suggests, and arguably 
even mandates: to work out in 
detail, on the basis of comparative 
studies, the principles of state 
liability common to the laws of the 
Member States, including the rich 
national case law in this respect. 
This would lay a basel ine for 
negotiations with third countries – 
rather than outdated and one-sided 
treaties merely patched to contain 
safeguards for EU policy space. 
Moreover, such a thorough approach 
would pr imari ly achieve what 
investment treaty law should be all 
about and what existing investment 
treaties hardly deliver, namely, legal 
certainty for both the investors and 
the host states. Understandably, this 
much more cumbersome and time-
consuming (academic) solution was 
much less attractive in political terms 
than a simple “no greater rights” 
affirmation.
While simple political solutions may 
address pressing public concerns, 
they sometimes risk turning ad 
absurdum. This would seem to 
be the case here: in line with the 
bipartisan negotiation principles 
first laid down in the 2002 US Trade 
Act, the US Trade Representative 
Marantis informed US Congress in 
March 2013 (six days before the 
“no greater rights” principle was 
first adopted in the EU Parliament’s 
Committee on International Trade) 
that the US Government’s specific 
objectives for the negotiations 
of the TTIP included to “seek to 
secure for U.S. investors in the 
EU important rights comparable 
to those that would be available 
under U.S. legal principles and 
practice, while ensuring that EU 
investors in the United States are 
not accorded greater substantive 
rights with respect to investment 
protections than U.S. investors in the 
United States.” “No greater rights” 
on both sides of the Atlantic…? If 
taken seriously, that is a riddle which 
only comparative public law studies 
on the principles of investment 
protection common to the US and 
the EU would really be able to solve.
Jan Kleinheisterkamp
(Department of Law,
London School of Economics
and Political Science)
3
 LOndOn  JUne 2014
Department of Law
The London School of Economics
and Political Science
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
Jan is Associate Professor 
of at LSE, where his 
research and teaching 
focuses on international 
arbitration, international 
contracts and investment 
treaty law. He has advised 
the EU Parliament and 
is a member of the ICC 
Governing Body and of the 
UK Government’s Advisory 
Group on International 
Arbitration and has advised 
the EU Parliament.
JAn
KLeInheIsterKAmP
